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Abstract 
Purpose – This study attempts to articulate the conceptual foundations of the role of internal 
auditing in corporate governance by drawing on Michel Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is a literature-based analysis of the role of 
internal auditing from a Foucauldian perspective.  
 
Findings – It is argued that Foucault’s notion of governmentality provides conceptual tools 
for researching internal auditing as a disciplinary mechanism in the corporate governance 
setting of contemporary organizations. The paper develops an initial conceptual formulation 
of internal auditing as (a) ex post assurance about the execution of economic activities within 
management’s preconceived frameworks and (b) ex ante advisory services to enhance the 
rationality of economic activities and accompanying controls. 
 
Originality/value – This paper extends the Foucauldian analysis of accounting to incorporate 
internal auditing. It offers original propositions as a research agenda and discusses 
ontological and epistemic considerations associated with adopting the Foucauldian 
framework for internal auditing research. 
  
Implications – The paper is expected to initiate debate on the choice of theory and method in 
internal auditing research. The propositions and research agenda discussed can be used to 
address research questions of an interpretive nature that could enrich our current 
understanding of internal auditing. 
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Introduction 
 
Internal auditing remains a neglected area of research (Gendron and Be´dard, 2006; Roussy, 
2014), despite its rise as an integral component of the corporate governance fabric of 
contemporary organizations, particularly in the wake of the spate of corporate collapses of the 
1990s and 2000s (Carcello et al., 2005a; Sarens et al., 2009; Maijoor, 2000; Gramling et al., 
2004). The function has increasingly been regarded as a key component of risk management 
(Spira and Page, 2003; Selim and McNamee, 1999; Arena et al., 2010; de Zwaan et al., 2011 
; Leung et al., 2003) that helps organizations fulfill corporate goals (Spira and Page, 2003; 
Gramling et al., 2004). The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) [1] defines internal auditing as 
“an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and 




organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance 
processes” (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2004, emphasis added) [2]. The agency theory 
perspective (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which continues as the dominant theoretical view 
informing internal auditing research (Adams, 1994; Mihret, 2014), has contributed to the 
internal auditing literature grounded in the positivist research approach. Under this research 
tradition, the origin of the demand for internal auditing is traced to the contractual 
relationships between management and shareholders of firms as part of addressing the agency 
problem in shareholder-manager relationships (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Nevertheless, 
agency theory’s explanation for the demand for internal auditing rests on the theory’s 
underpinning positivist ontological assumption that empirical phenomena represent an 
objective reality unaffected by context—a view that can be challenged from interpretive 
research perspectives.  
 
The argument of the present paper is based on the premise that the predominant choice of a 
positivist approach to internal auditing research leads to conceptualizing the function as a 
neutral technical tool and that this results in neglecting the complex social context in which 
internal auditing is deployed as a technology for exercising power. Innovative theoretical 
approaches, increasingly advocated for accounting and auditing research (Guthrie and Parker, 
2012), therefore, are needed to address such theoretical difficulties by enabling us to 
understand complex phenomena in their contexts (Parker, 2008). The Foucauldian framework 
is one possible approach that can be employed for this purpose. It has been used in major 
streams of accounting research to explain how systems, practices, and techniques are 
implicated in the exercise of power (Townley, 1993; Miller and Rose, 1990). Specifically, the 
literature illustrates that financial accounting makes organizational activities increasingly 
governable by rendering them measurable and visible (Hines, 1988; Morgan, 1988) and that 
management accounting provides further tools and vocabularies that enable management 
actions in the planning and control of organizations (Preston, 1992; Loft, 1986; Robson, 
1992; Miller and O'leary, 1987). Auditors serve in this context as an added layer of 
governance by subjecting outputs of accounting to independent verification, investigation, 
and evaluation, as illustrated in Radcliffe’s (1999; 1998) analysis of public sector efficiency 
auditing.  
 
Despite the rising significance of internal auditing and its development as a distinct sub-
discipline aiming to “help” management foster organizational goal achievement (Roussy, 
2013), it has surprisingly not received Foucauldian intellectual consideration, arguably due to 
the supposition that internal audit work overlaps with external, i.e., financial, auditing. As the 
IIA’s latest survey of North American chief internal audit executives and internal auditors 
(IIA, 2014) indicates, financial audit activity only constitutes 9% of internal auditors’ scope 
of work [3]. Internal auditors offer direct insights through recommendations for management 
action (Chambers, 2014), thereby providing ‘support’ and ‘guidance’ to management (see, for 
example, Roussy, 2014). Consistent with this claim, internal auditors tend to side with 
management when they face situations of divided loyalties between management and the 
board of directors (see, for example, Roussy, 2013). This contrasts with external auditors’ 
virtue of keeping distance from client management to advance the public interest.  
 
Commensurate with its distinct current standing, internal auditing has followed a historical 
path separate from financial accounting, management accounting, and external audits of 
financial statements. Before the 1940s, the main focus of internal auditing was checking the 




economy based on the concept of “systems” facilitated the emergence of contemporary 
internal auditing with a focus on the evaluation of such systems (McNamee and McNamee, 
1995) matched with a focus on systems that gradually replaced the emphasis on activities 
(Power, 1994) as a cardinal management approach and the modality of exercise of power.  
 
The current definition of internal auditing highlighted above reflects the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations’ broad conceptualization of internal controls and the integration of 
controls in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 
2004). The ERM framework emphasizes the importance of risk management in corporate 
governance and the role of mechanisms such as internal auditing in this process. Thus, 
internal auditing is interpreted in this paper as a risk-management technology that provides ex 
ante advisory and ex post assurance services by identifying areas of an organization that 
could lead to failure to achieve organizational goals. Prima facie, attaining organizational 
goals is premised on the ability of management to manage risk, which involves defining 
goals, identifying risk drivers, and implementing appropriate risk responses and the social 
relations in which controls are exercised. Internal audit’s advisory role (Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2012) can be interpreted as proactively recommending appropriate responses for 
addressing risk, and its assurance role (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2012) can be understood 
as a post hoc evaluation of risk to assist organizations in fending off possible future obstacles 
to their corporate objectives (Sarens and Beelde, 2006), particularly wealth creation and 
preservation. This role of internal auditing in risk management within the firm is also distinct 
from potential investors’, creditors’, shareholders’, and other parties’ use of audited financial 
information to manage risks associated with their business dealings with the firm. 
 
Against this background, we explore the conceptual foundations of internal auditing as a 
distinct corporate governance technology using the concept of governmentality originating 
with the work of Michel Foucault, and we offer a research agenda consistent with 
Foucauldian ontological and epistemological positions (see, for example, Dean, 1999, pp. 10-
19; Esmark, 2015). Governmentality comprises the concepts of government and rationality. 
On this account, government is understood “not just [as] a power needing to be tamed or an 
authority needing to be legitimized”; rather, it “is an activity and an art which concerns all 
and touches each” (Burchell et al., 1991, , p. x; emphasis added). As such, government is not 
confined to institutional structures of authority. Rather, it is a pervasive empirical 
phenomenon, the characteristics of which are nevertheless specific to particular sites, 
practices, and organizations. On this account, rationality is understood as the need to know 
what is being governed in order to direct activity toward achieving certain ends (Neu, 2006; 
Miller and O'leary, 1987). Previous work on governmentality has emphasized that the 
operation of governmental power makes “action at a distance” possible in the management 
(Armstrong, 1994) of complex organizations through the translation of distant reality into 
stable, movable, and combinable forms (Robson, 1992). More recently, and capturing the 
core of Foucault’s (1977; 1978) working of the idea, governmentality has been described as 
“a particular, regulatory game of freedom and security” (Esmark, 2015, p. 21). It is these 
ideas that we apply to the operation of internal auditing here. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section develops a conceptual 
framework for the paper by outlining Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality and 
exploring some recent work theorizing the concept. The ensuing section articulates the role of 
internal auditing in contemporary corporate governance using the framework developed in 
the second section. The final section concludes the paper by drawing on research implications 







In attempting to formulate a conceptual basis of the role of internal auditing in corporate 
governance, we employ, as an illustrative lens, the function’s role in assisting management 
and the board of directors to manage risk. The Foucauldian concept of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1980) provides useful insights into this endeavor, and it has been increasingly 
adopted in accounting and management research (Carter et al., 2002). We have noted that the 
term is derived from the concepts of government and rationality (“governmental rationality”). 
In the case of government, it is necessary to comprehend both the epistemic and the ethical 
status of this phenomenon as an “art” rather than the exercise of legitimate authority. 
Furthermore, at a particular point in his work, Foucault (1977) investigated the transposition 
of sovereign power from the site of the monarch to the modern state, where the latter was 
defined in terms of institutionally specific practices (the Benthamite prison, for example). 
However, rather than governmentality merely being a totalizing instrumental/moral 
narrative—and despite the fact that, as Gordon (1991, p. 3) observed, Foucault saw it as 
characteristic of Western societies to both “totalize” and “individualize”—governmentality is 
equally applicable to technologies of “micro-power” and the corporation, for example, as it is 
to public institutions charged with tax collection, law and order, and national defense. 
Foucault (1991, p. 54) was clear in this regard and, while his own investigations ranged 
across the development of the modern prison (Foucault, 1977) as well as psychology and 
medicine (see, for example, Foucault, 1981), scholars deploying this approach have applied it 
to a diverse range of phenomena (see, for example, Dean and Hindess, 1998). Integral to the 
concept of governmentality, rationality refers to the centrality of knowing what is being 
governed to ensure goals are met (Townley, 1993). As such, the two phenomena are 
inextricably bound: the desirability of government requires not merely knowledge of what is 
to be governed, which is necessarily post facto, but knowledge of that subject when it is being 
governed, which is necessarily ex ante and thereby involves the calculation of risk (see, for 
example, Defert, 1991; Ewald, 1991). Furthermore, in his essay “Governmentality”, Foucault 
(1991, p. 92) observed that “[t]he art of government … is essentially concerned with 
answering the question of how to introduce economy – that is to say, the correct manner of 
managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family” (emphasis added). This is 
immediately paralleled with the conception of the modern state, where “the essential issue in 
the establishment of the art of government [is the] introduction of economy into political 
practice” (Foucault, 1991, p. 92).  
 
As an element of Foucault’s work generally, as well as the scholarly literature examining the 
topic, governmentality has several other notable features, themes or broad propositions that 
are relevant for our discussion here. First, governmentality is grounded in the notion of 
power/knowledge, which we have discussed here in relation to the more specific concept of 
rationality but which is nevertheless more broadly applicable to systems of knowledge and 
indicates the constitutive relation between knowledge and power in the sense that the 
acquisition of knowledge is integral to the exercise of power (Foucault, 1980). The notion of 
power/knowledge underpins various technologies that render phenomena knowable and thus 
governable. The nature of Foucault’s concept of power (Miller and O'leary, 1987) requires an 
understanding of individuals as self-regulating agents (Foucault, 1982). However, this does 
not imply individual freedom in a political or liberal sense: the theory of governmentality 
presumes that individuals are accorded “regulated autonomy” in the exercise of control 
(Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller and Rose, 2008). Stated differently, 




align their particular wills with ends imposed on them through constraining and facilitating 
models of possible actions. Government presupposes and requires the activity and freedom 
of the governed” (Burchell, 1991, , p. 119; emphasis added). 
 
Second, the concept of surveillance, as exemplified by Bentham’s (1995) panopticon, forms a 
core analogy in Foucault’s account of the operation of governmentality (see, in particular, 
Foucault, 1977). Originally, Bentham (1995) presented the panopticon as a model for an 
effective prison. Nevertheless, he also used the concept as a central tenet of his principles of 
good management (Gallhofer and Haslam, 1993, , p. 320). He explained that the idea of the 
panopticon can be applied “to the purposes of perpetual prisons in the room of death, or 
prisons for confinement before trial, or penitentiary-houses, or houses of correction, or work-
houses, or manufactories, or mad-houses, or hospitals, or schools”. The idea of the 
panopticon also comprises Bentham’s concept of “publicity”, or transparency, which is held 
as a central tenet of contemporary good governance across private corporations and public 
administrations (Hood, 2010). According to this principle, management attempts to reduce 
inefficiency and mismanagement to avoid the undesired publicity of such matters. Thus, 
Bentham maintained that transparency of organizations in the public context leads to good 
performance from both moral and economic perspectives (Holland and Foo, 2003). 
 
To appreciate the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, it is important be attuned to the 
subtleties of the metaphor of the panopticon. Governmentality is not accurately characterized 
merely by individuals’ compliance to predetermined standards or measures. Rather, it is in 
the act of conducting (Deleuze, 1988, , p. 10) their own activities at work or in the context of 
incarceration (for example) that individuals are necessarily accorded the autonomy to 
comprehend and discipline themselves. This by no means implies that they can do anything 
they wish. On the contrary: a particular individual will know, in essence, the fundamental 
parameters of the game—so, for example, they might be remunerated amount ‘A’ to work 
hours ‘H’ to produce an expected outcome ‘O’—yet they are afforded the opportunity of 
gaming the system in a particular, broad direction (toward increased productivity, to explore 
innovative techniques of production, etc.). This concept of autonomy, exemplified in 
allowing individuals to self-regulate, is an essential element of governmentality. Furthermore, 
we suggest that the act of self-regulation—implying the autonomy to do so and how this then 
relates to the systematic coherence of the organization—more accurately depicts 
governmentality in a Foucauldian sense, or what Deleuze (1988) described as Foucault’s 
“functional” analysis of power [4]. 
 
Third, the presence of distance necessitates the use of technologies to make possible the 
taking of control actions at distant sites (Latour, 1978, , p. 222). Distance entails the problem 
of control, and overcoming this problem necessitates the use of technologies of translation 
(Robson, 1992). Latour (1978, p. 223) argues that acting at a distance becomes possible 
trough translation ‘by inventing means that: (a) render [the objects of control] mobile so that 
they can be brought back [to the center]; (b) keep them stable so that they can be moved back 
and forth without additional distortion, corruption or decay; and (c) [make them] combinable 
so that whatever stuff they are made of, they can be cumulated, aggregated, or shuffled like a 
pack of cards’ [emphasis added]. Thus, technologies enable the ‘center’ to take action at 
distant sites by virtue of the knowability rendered by the use of vocabularies that technologies 
provide (Armstrong, 1994). Utilizing this approach, accounting has been conceptualized as a 
technology that translates accountable activities of organizations through these attributes of 
technology of governance. The key feature of the translation technologies such as accounting 




ambiguity involves ensuring correspondence of the translated inscriptions with the reality to 
which they relate. Nevertheless, the task of translation, such as quantification, is prone to 
generating its own ambiguity (Robson, 1992). This ambiguity calls for auditors assurance 
services on the correspondence of the reports with the pertinent reality, as well as 
recommendations about control actions that management could take (see, for example, 
Roussy, 2013). 
 
Fourth, if we allow for the concept of governmentality to be applied to the individual (ethical) 
level, through the organizational to societal level as suggested by Dean (1999, p. 13), it 
becomes a heuristic for both description and explanation at these levels of analysis. For 
example, in his recent discussion, Esmark (2015, p. 6) asserts that ‘the term governmentality 
can simply be treated as a synonym of liberal government and governmental management’. 
For Esmark (2015, p. 1), liberal government (i.e., governmentality) is not ‘a minimal 
government pursuing laissez-faire politics [rather, it] is an omnipresent form of government 
aiming to widen and deepen a particular game of freedom and security [emphasis added]’: 
Within the game of freedom and security, freedom is not a moral or a legal principle, nor a matter of 
fundamental rights or protection from intervention. Liberal government seeks to increase behavioral 
freedom based on an expected outcome and carefully calibrates and adjusts freedoms according to its 
ongoing calculus of freedom and security. Security is the cost of manufacturing freedom (Esmark, 2015, 
p. 20). 
 
In this context, we take particular heed of Esmark’s (2015, p. 25) comments regarding a 
revised method for analysis, namely: ‘Rather than including the level of governmental 
technology directly in the analysis, the history of governmentality [also, we assert, the theory 
thereof as described above] enables the history of specific technologies such as contracts, 
budgets, evaluation schemas, auditing systems and so on against a background of overall 
governmental rationality and practice’. It is with such a frame in mind—particularly 
Esmark’s (2015, p. 21) ‘regulatory game of freedom and security’, whereby freedom is both 
“constructed” and “consumed” to produce more security—that we examine internal auditing. 
 




Internal auditing is regarded as a corporate governance mechanism. Corporate governance 
emphasizes stewardship and firm performance goals (Keasey and Wright, 1993; Short et al., 
1999). Short et al. (1999, , p. 338) underscore this balanced emphasis on both control and 
performance in conceptualizing corporate governance as “the mix of those devices, 
mechanisms, and structures which provide control and accountability while promoting 
economic enterprise and corporate performance.” The control goal of corporate governance 
ensures that the stewardship responsibility of management to shareholders is fulfilled. On the 
other hand, the performance goal concentrates on enhancing the efficiency of the firm to 
increase shareholders’ wealth (Hart, 1995; Keasey and Wright, 1993). Consistent with this 
understanding, the OECD conceptualizes corporate governance as “a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.” The 
OECD also elaborates that “[g]ood corporate governance should provide proper incentives 
for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.” In such a system of corporate 
governance, the board of directors is responsible for “strategic guidance of the company and 




and the shareholders” (OECD, 2004, p. 58). As COSO (Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations, 2004, p. 1) explains:  
Value is maximized when management sets strategy and objectives to strike an optimal balance 
between growth and return goals and related risks, and efficiently and effectively deploys resources in 
pursuit of the entity’s objectives. 
 
Corporate governance structures with accountability mechanisms become necessary because 
it is impractical to cover future eventualities in principal-agent contracts of organizations 
(Hart, 1995; Keasey and Wright, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The systems of corporate 
governance provide a framework that defines the rights and responsibilities of parties, 
legitimates their actions, and outlines the relationships of accountability (Macdonald and 
Beattie, 1993) against the background of fulfilling the firm’s stewardship responsibility to 
shareholders and increasing shareholders’ wealth. Systems of corporate accountability are 
established to “bridge the gap” between the expected and actual performance of the boards of 
directors (Huse, 2005, p. S67; Roberts et al., 2005). This accountability relationship of the 
board and shareholders extends to various levels of management and to employees. The logic 
of business activities and the benchmarks of their ex post evaluation, that is, audit (Keasey 
and Wright, 1993), are inscribed in organizational policies, procedures, plans, programs, and 
budgets. In this framework, management acts as an agent to control the firm’s operations in 
accordance with corporate governance expectations.  
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) presents audit committees, internal auditing, and 
external auditing as the “three-legged-stool” of corporate governance that enhances the 
reliability of financial reports. The enhanced focus on internal auditing as a means of 
fostering audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality (DeZoort et al., 2003), 
especially following the corporate collapses of the 1990s and 2000s (Johnson, 2007), 
signifies this recognition. The increased centrality of risk management and internal controls 
in corporate governance (Dewing and Russell, 2008; Power, 2004b) bears particularly far-
reaching significance as an illustrative lens through which to conceptualize the role of 
internal auditing in this context (Leung et al., 2011). Contemporary control practices cater to 
both stewardship and enterprise dimensions of corporate accountability goals (Turnbull, 
1997), which can be affected by risk. Internal auditing can be conceptualized as one such 
mechanism that assists management and the board of directors to manage risk not only by 
identifying areas that warrant management intervention to ensure corporate goal achievement 
but also providing recommendations on appropriate management action. Despite variations in 
practices across countries (Demidenko and McNutt, 2010), risk management is regarded as a 
key component of corporate governance that enables organizations to fulfill goals 
(Subramaniam et al., 2009). Examining the role of internal auditing in the context of ERM, 
which is a central notion in the governance of contemporary organizations (Beasley et al., 
2005; Gordon et al., 2009), clarifies the role of internal auditing as a risk management 
technology. COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 2004) defines ERM as a: 
process, effected by an entity’s board of directors , management and other personnel applied in strategy 
setting, and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives. 
 
Internal controls, with which internal auditing is closely associated, are regarded as a 
response to risk (Sarens and Beelde, 2006; Lenz and Hahn, 2015) and are integrated into 
ERM (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 2004). Thus, internal auditing can be 
conceived of as a technology enmeshed in the overall fabric of ERM—systems that are, 




security’. Understanding this conception requires elaborating control rationalities under 
which internal auditing has been exercised. Management employs the control strategy of 
“responsible autonomy”, which is consistent with the concept of regulated autonomy from 
the Foucauldian perspective (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose and Miller, 1992). Consistent with 
the transformation from the use of sovereign power to disciplinary power to governmentality 
over the past two centuries (Foucault, 1977), contemporary control practices of organizations 
involve soliciting employees’ consent, necessarily implying the freedom for them to so do. 
Controls, as an essential feature of organizations, aim to ensure circumscription of 
idiosyncratic behaviors and diverse interests of individuals in ways consistent with 
organizational rationalities (Tannenbaum, 1967), which remain a crucial notion in 
governmentality, yet not extinguish the space for devising systems of self-regulation. This 
notion indicates that because control and deviance tendencies are inherent in organizations, 
monitoring and assurance technologies (such as internal auditing) become crucial to ensuring 
broad conformity (Baldamus, 1961), yet they allow for the ‘play’ of both individuals and 
discrete units (departments; firms) within an organization. The aim of internal auditing as a 
risk-management technology is ensuring that not only are the rationalities ascribed to 
bureaucratic controls implemented but also that such rationalities are continually assessed for 
efficacy and appropriately enhanced. Such a technology adds higher-order knowability to 
those provided by the calculative technologies, organizational policies, and procedural 
frameworks in which economic activities are undertaken. The heightened emphasis of 
corporate governance on ERM helps “an entity get to where it wants to go and avoid pitfalls 
and surprises along the way” (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 2004, p. 1), and the 
role of internal auditing in this process provides a useful context for analysis. As highlighted 
earlier in this paper, it can be argued that the specific roles of internal auditors in corporate 
governance and its relationships with other components of corporate governance transform 
along with developments in the institutional landscape. Therefore, the following proposition 
is worth pursuing: 
 
Proposition 1. Developments that transform the roles of boards of directors and 
management in corporate governance will drive a concomitant shift in the 
portfolio of internal auditing services. 
 
Internal auditing as a risk-management technology 
 
The increased size and complexity of organizations has made ERM a key issue in governing 
organizations (Beasley et al., 2005), which in turn has revitalized the role of internal auditing. 
Current thinking that risk management is fundamentally a control problem (Spira and Page 
2003; Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 1992) illuminates internal auditing as a risk-
management technology deployed in making economic activities governable by providing 
assurance on organizations’ systems, processes, and activities. Theory construction concerned 
with the risk-management rationale of internal auditing requires unpacking the concept of 
risk itself, alongside its management. Consistent with major roles of internal auditing 
highlighting the function’s definition, COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations, 2004, 
p. 2) explains the relationships among uncertainty, risk, and opportunities as follows: 
Events can have negative impact, positive impact, or both. Events with a negative impact represent 
risks, which can prevent value creation or erode existing value. Events with positive impact may offset 
negative impacts or represent opportunities. Opportunities are the possibility that an event will occur 
and positively affect the achievement of objectives, supporting value creation or preservation. 
Management channels opportunities back to its strategy or objective-setting processes, formulating 





Risk management involves three tasks: defining the goals of the organization, identifying the 
potential drivers of risk, and laying out appropriate risk responses (Ritchie and Brindley, 
2007; Sitkin and Amy, 1992). The first two components in this process relate to the general 
principle of risk assessment. The response aspect is the principle of control action invoked to 
ensure that goals are achieved (Boehm, 1991). The complexity of an organization’s activities 
and the external environment within which it operates mean that achieving its goals always 
carries the possibility of risk (Beasley et al., 2005). According to Beck (1992), contemporary 
society has reached a stage of development whereby risk is too great to be fully addressed 
through insurance, and its statistical prognosis is complex. While Beck (1992) pitched his 
notable argument mainly at a societal level, its implications for risk management at the 
microeconomic level are also evident (Spira and Page, 2003), as eventuation of risk at a 
societal level produces cascading effects upon individual organizations (Juttner et al., 2003; 
Christopher and Peck, 2004). The increasing complexity of business, coupled with external 
risk factors uncontrollable by microeconomic actors, requires that organizations govern risk 
through technologies that ensure “continuity of the past” (Aradau and Munster, 2007; 
Diprose et al., 2008). In the context of organizations, this is salient in the continuing to strive 
to achieve corporate goals.  
 
The analytical space of the relationships between management and internal auditing 
demonstrates that internal auditing is a technology used to operationalize governmentality. 
Internal auditing uses identified evaluative frameworks to render auditees at distant sites 
governable by not only pointing out areas that need corrective action but also offering 
insights for management action. Some tools of governmentality can be applied in the absence 
of internal auditing. For example, organizational policies and the legal framework in which 
organizational activities are undertaken, as well as calculative systems such as management 
accounting and financial accounting, make governance possible. On top of these tools, 
independent diagnostic and evaluative reports by internal auditors enable management to take 
corrective action in selected areas of the organization based on the auditor’s 
recommendations. Internal auditors provide their services on a broad range of areas; in 
contrast, external auditors focus on the financial aspects of the organization. For instance, the 
major concern of internal auditing with economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Al-Twaijry et 
al., 2003; San Miguel and Govindarajan, 1984)—the 3Es—is closely intertwined with the 
notion of risk management and how risks are governed through technologies. This focus 
indicates that internal auditing assists management by identifying potential disturbances that 
may hinder organizations from achieving their goals. Within the framework of organizational 
policies and procedures that serve as control parameters, internal auditing assists the 
organization in managing risk in an assortment of its activities. It helps prevent future 
irregularities based on a post hoc evaluation, and it enhances economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003; Allegrini and D'Onza, 2003) through ex ante 
recommendations for appropriate management action. Internal audit reports also add 
credibility to self-produced information presented by the organizational components being 
evaluated. From the Foucauldian perspective, the individual is regarded as discursively 
constituted through the practices of power/knowledge (Armstrong, 1994), which makes 
governing economic life a complex practice in which both the management and employees 
exercise some power (Miller and Rose, 1990). This concept is particularly important for 
understanding internal audit’s relationship with auditees in terms trust and cooperation. 





Proposition 2.  A surprise-audit strategy will produce compliant behavior in auditees by 
creating the impression of a possible audit at any time, even when limited capacity of the 
internal audit department makes it impractical to cover all components of an 
organization in an audit plan in any particular audit period. 
Also, Foucault’s concept of surveillance (panopticon) illuminates how internal auditing is 
deployed by management to induce subjects to police themselves, as the latter do not know 
when their activities would be subjected to audit examination. The presence of internal 
auditing generates a pattern of employee behavior that makes the discursive nature of the 
exercise of power evident. This interpretation enables us to conceptualize the preventive role 
of internal auditors in risk management. Furthermore, the Foucauldian concept of self-
knowledge can facilitate auditees’ control self-assessment used by internal auditors (Sarens 
and Beelde 2006) and is an integral part of rendering subjects governable (Foucault 1982). 
The whole process of internal audit evidence-gathering, undertaken with the cooperation of 
the auditee, presumes auditees’ self-knowledge. Because the effectiveness of internal auditing 
as a surveillance mechanism depends on whether the auditee has knowledge of when audits 
are to be conducted, we forward the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. A surprise-audit strategy will produce compliant behavior in auditees by 
creating the impression that they could be audited at any time, even when the limited 
capacity of the internal audit department makes it impractical to cover all components of 
an organization in an audit plan in any particular audit period.  
 
Contemporary internal auditing has enhanced the quality of corporate governance, especially 
in more recent times (Cohen et al., 2004; Spira and Page, 2003), by assuring boards of 
directors about the proper management of risk (Carrington and Catasús, 2007; Sarens et al., 
2009). The empirical literature provides evidence that companies’ internal audit budgets tend 
to be high in organizations that are exposed to high risk (Carcello et al., 2005b) and 
committed to managing risk (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006). As Gramling et al. (2004, p. 
194) state, internal auditing is considered a cornerstone of corporate governance that “serves 
as a resource to each of the other three cornerstones [i.e., board of directors, management and 
external auditors] of corporate governance.” Furthermore, the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act following the financial reporting scandals affirmed the importance of internal 
auditing (Carey et al., 2006). For instance, under this Act, companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange are required to maintain internal audit departments that assist audit 
committees in risk management by ensuring that sound internal controls are in place 
(Carcello et al., 2005b; Christopher et al., 2009; Gramling et al., 2004).  
 
Organizations invest in control systems to increase productivity and maximize returns. 
Internal auditors’ role in the mitigation of wastage of resources by deterring fraud 
(Raghunandan and Mchugh, 1994; Beasley et al., 2000; Mihret et al., 2010) can also be 
understood as originating from the risk-management imperative in this regard (Spira and 
Page, 2003), grounded in the use of technologies. Similarly, internal auditors’ advice about 
the efficient and effective use of resources (Al-Twaijry et al., 2003) helps management 
address risks ex ante by identifying conditions that potentially hinder the enterprise from 
achieving its corporate goals and recommending solutions to address them. The ex post 
evaluation aspect of internal auditing promotes internal audit independence from 
management (Goodwin and Yeoh, 2001; Christopher et al., 2009), whereas the ex ante 




(Roth 2000, 2002; Bou-Raad, 2000; Goodwin, 2004). The services of internal auditing cover 
a broad range of services, including operational, compliance/regulatory, Sarbanes-Oxley, 
information technology, financial, risk management, business strategy, corporate governance, 
and fraud (IIA, 2014).  Discharging these broad sets of responsibilities demands a high level 
of professionalism and broad skillsets. Because a claim to expertise is a crucial element of 
professionals’ perceived ability to address relevant societal problems (Miller and Napier, 
1993), broadening the skillset of internal audit departments may influence the perceived 
value of the internal audit and its acceptance by internal audit stakeholders. Thus, the 
following propositions are worth pursuing: 
 
Proposition 4. Broadening internal auditors’ skillsets and enhancing the professionalism of 
internal auditors fosters the disciplinary power of internal auditing, thereby producing 
compliant behavior in auditees. 
Proposition 5. Broadening skillsets and enhancing the professionalism of internal auditors 
fosters the acceptance of internal auditing by management, boards of directors, and 
auditees as an effective technology of governance.  
Economic activities assembled around analytical platforms such as the value chain serve as 
objects of internal auditing. These tools illustrate how the relationships among various 
activities of organizations are configured toward the common goal that ties parts of the 
organization together. These types of tools help abstract, plan, and record an organization’s 
economic activities on paper. Based on such translations of objects of control (Latour, 1986) 
into vocabularies of governmentality, internal auditors recommend to management 
improvements in the systems of the value-creation activities through the internal audit’s focus 
on the 3Es. Various subsets of the value chain could be an object of internal audit reporting to 
top management. The articulation of economic activities in such conceptual platforms serves 
to translate phenomena into movable concepts and thus make them amenable for action at a 
distance (Latour, 1978). Thus, internal auditing can be viewed as a technique that facilitates 
management of the value chain by highlighting categories that need management action when 
potential or actual risks are identified. It fills the gap in any visibility of categories that could 
exist, because calculative technologies, including accounting, cannot eliminate ambiguity and 
bias. The discourse of risk management as a control problem (Rasmussen, 1997) is affirmed 
by the Combined Code (UK Financial Reporting Council, 1998) and COSO reports (Power, 
2004a). In particular, the COSO framework’s definition of internal control consolidates the 
risk-management conceptualization of internal controls (Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations, 1992). COSO defines controls as: 
 a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories:  
Effectiveness and efficiency of operations; 
Reliability of financial reporting 
Compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
Such a broad concept of internal controls adopted in corporate governance creates 
opportunities for internal auditing to provide assurance and advisory services in the arena of 
risk management. In particular, the shift in top management responsibility, from compliance 
with policies toward a focus on key risks, has fostered the role of internal auditing. This shift 
has led to management assuming responsibility for internal control systems and boards of 




accountability to shareholders (Spira and Page, 2003). Due to this shift in thinking about risk 
at the societal level (Aradau and Munster, 2007; Diprose et al., 2008), rational knowledge 
and calculation became crucial for carrying out informed control action (Miller and Rose, 
1990). In line with this thinking, internal auditors’ intimate knowledge of organizational 
idiosyncrasies and their role in risk management has been one of the major premises of the 
IIA’s stand against outsourcing of internal auditing to external auditors (Covaleski et al., 
2003; Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001). Hence, it can be argued that the role of internal 
auditing has been expanding along with the risk-management imperatives in the audit 
universe. Dimensions of performance, risk drivers, exposures, and the responses that are 
applicable under the given circumstances (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007) are implied in the 
planning and execution of internal auditing, as suggested by the professional standards for the 
practice of internal auditing (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2012). In addition, the internal 
auditing professionalization literature suggests that despite the development of certification 
and international standards of performance for internal auditors, internal auditing has not yet 
developed as a fully-fledged profession with regulatory oversight (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010; 
Fogarty and Kalbers, 2000), and its ethical framework continues to be ambiguous (Everett 
and Tremblay, 2014, p. 182). The reporting relationship of internal auditing with the 
management and board of directors may also impact the performance of internal auditors 
(Everett and Tremblay, 2014; Roussy, 2014). This can lead to a lack of uniformity in the 
focus of internal auditing and the consolidation of management’s use of internal auditing as a 
technology of governance at its disposal. Thus, we forward the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 6. Internal auditing is a localized governance technology in an organization with 
standards of performance not necessarily circumscribed in professional standards of 
practice. Thus, approaches to assessing internal auditing as an effective disciplinary 
mechanism may be contingent upon the specifics of the organization, yet researchers 
should nevertheless be cognizant of a trend toward increased professionalization. 
Conclusion and research implications  
This paper has attempted to establish the conceptual foundations of the role of internal 
auditing in corporate governance using, as an illustrative lens, the function’s role in assisting 
management in dealing with risk. It has argued that internal auditing can be conceptualized as 
providing: (a) ex post assurance about the execution of economic activities within 
management’s preconceived frameworks and (b) ex ante advisory services that enhance the 
rationality of economic activities and the accompanying controls of organizations. 
Nevertheless, both activities allow room for Esmark’s (2015) ‘regulatory game of freedom 
and security’ that nevertheless tends toward increased security. This overall heuristic does not 
discount that variations in corporate governance practices across both countries (see for 
example,  Macdonald and Beattie, 1993) and companies can influence the power/knowledge 
dynamics of the governance setting. This discourse-specific and, thus, institution-specific 
understanding of the Foucauldian framework can be set against the tendency to view 
governmentality as an account of overarching power/knowledge, as cautioned against in our 
account of governmentality above and as explicitly rejected by Foucault (see, for example, 
Foucault, 1991, , p. 53). The way in which internal audit services are predominantly used 
may be influenced by key concerns and operating characteristics of the relevant governance 
framework. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the six propositions developed in this paper and provides 




investigated research questions suitable for future research as well as proposing suitable 
research approaches.  As suggested in the first five propositions, the Foucauldian framework 
enables us to consider the social context of internal auditing to understand relationships of 
internal auditing with auditees, management, and boards of directors. This framework also 
enables organizations to gauge the effectiveness of internal auditing in view of the particular 
context in which internal auditing is employed as a technology of governance as 
conceptualized in the sixth proposition. Our interpretive research agenda caters to social 
aspects of internal auditing that are neglected in the economics-based, i.e., positivist studies 
that largely tackled questions founded in the realist ontological position (Chua, 1986). For 
example, prior research in internal auditing focuses on the association of testing hypotheses 
on internal audit quality and financial reporting fraud (e.g., Prawitt et al., 2009), internal audit 
outsourcing and the risk of fraudulent financial reporting (e.g., Prawitt et al., 2012), audit 
committee characteristics and the interaction of internal auditors with the audit committee 
(e.g., Raghunandan et al., 2001), and firm characteristics and  the presence/absence of 
internal audit departments in an organization (Adams, 1994). As suggested in the 
propositions developed in the present study, addressing research issues such as how internal 
auditors manage conflicting demands of stakeholders (see, for example, Chambers, 2014) 
will extend emerging interpretive research in internal auditing (example, Everett and 
Tremblay, 2014; Roussy, 2014).  
 
The research agenda offered in this study also addresses another key shortcoming of prior 
research that originates from the choice of the realist philosophical position and associated 
positivist research approaches. That is, prior research focused on essentially cross-sectional 
research questions. By contrast, the research questions that follow from our conceptualization 
of internal auditing accommodate emergent and developmental research issues in internal 
auditing such as those listed in Table 1. In terms of research approach, longitudinal research, 
including historical studies of the transformation of internal auditing along with changes in 
the institutional climate, could be undertaken, with flexible data sources spanning archival 
sources, interviews and surveys (detailed in Table 1 for each proposition). Such an 
interpretive research approach addresses the limitations associated with economic theory-
based research in internal auditing that neglects relevant research issues involving 
development and change. Nevertheless, the last five propositions can also serve as a basis to 
develop hypotheses that can be tested in the cross-sectional sense, as shown by some of the 




Table 1. Summary of the research agenda 
Foucauldian propositions Suggested research issues Suggested research approach Possible data source(s) 
P1. Developments that transform the roles of boards of 
directors and management in corporate governance 
will drive a concomitant shift in the portfolio of 
internal auditing services. 
- How does the role of internal auditors transform along with changes in the 
institutional landscape?  
- How do external institutional pressures and the perceived role of internal 
auditors motivate internal audit adoption by organizations?  
 -How does the insourcing versus outsourcing of internal auditing influence 
the way internal auditing is used as a technology? 
– Which internal audit practices are generic and which are transient? 
- historical studies  
- interpretive study based on a 
longitudinal design 
- interviews, survey, and/or 
review of organizational 
records 
 
P2. A surprise-audit strategy will produce compliant 
behavior in auditees by creating the impression of a 
possible audit at any time, even when limited 
capacity of the internal audit department makes it 
impractical to cover all components of an 
organization in an audit plan in any particular audit 
period.  
- How does the type of internal audit strategy influence auditee compliance 
behavior of auditees?  
- How do alternations in audit strategies influence the level of trust between 
auditees and auditors? 
 
- interpretive study based on a 
longitudinal design 
- cross-sectional  study 
- interviews, survey, and/or 
review of organizational 
records 
 
P3. Auditees will tend to be suspicious of the role of 
internal auditing and thus be minimalist in their 
cooperation with (or support of) internal auditors 
because auditing may be perceived as a surveillance 
tool with a disruptive impact on the regular activities 
of the organization. 
- How do auditees perceive internal auditors’ role? 
- What strategies do internal auditors employ to forester auditees’ trust in 
auditors? 
- interpretive study based on a 
longitudinal design 
- cross-sectional study 
- interviews, survey, and/or 
review of organizational 
records 
 
P4. Broadening internal auditors’ skillsets and 
enhancing the professionalism of internal auditors 
fosters the disciplinary power of internal auditing, 
thereby producing compliant behavior in auditees.  
- Does the breadth of skillsets of internal auditors and their expertise 
influence stakeholders’ perception about internal auditors? 
 
- interpretive study based on a 
longitudinal design 
- cross-sectional  study 
- interviews, survey, and/or 
review of organizational 
records 
P5. Broadening skillsets and enhancing the 
professionalism of internal auditors fosters the 
acceptance of internal auditing by management, 
boards of directors, and auditees as an effective 
technology of governance.  
- Does the internal auditors’ level of professional certification enhance the 
perceived effectiveness of internal auditors?  
- How is the service portfolio of internal auditing determined? 
- interpretive study based on a 
longitudinal design 
- cross-sectional  study 
- interviews, survey, and/or 
review of organizational 
records 
 
P6.  Internal auditing is a localized governance 
technology in an organization with standards of 
performance not necessarily circumscribed in 
- How do professional standards of internal auditors translate into suitable 
frameworks for localized internal audit practices while preserving the 
sufficiency of the framework to provide a basis for minimum professional 
- interpretive study based on a 
longitudinal design 
- interviews, survey, and/or 




professional standards of practice. Thus, approaches 
to assess internal auditing as an effective 
disciplinary mechanism may be contingent upon 
specifics of the organization, yet researchers should 
nevertheless be cognizant of a trend toward 
increased professionalization. 
standards? 
- What local factors determine the extent of compliance of internal auditors 
with the professional standards of internal auditors? 
- How do internal auditors manage issues of reconciling conflicting 
expectations of stakeholders such as the board, management, and 
employees?  
 




The propositions are not necessarily supported under a positivist research approach, as our 
research agenda is grounded in the critical theoretical framework derived from understanding 
the logic of the panopticon, and the concept of individual autonomy as we have described it 
here is a necessary element of this operational logic. At the same time, undertaking an inquiry 
into the role of internal auditing deploying the Foucauldian propositions suggested here by no 
means implies that the results of empirical inquiry will confirm the assumptions of the theory; 
on the contrary. For example, Proposition 3, that auditees will tend to be suspicious of the 
role of internal auditing and thus be minimalist in their cooperation, could be thrown into 
question should a particular empirical study suggest that this is not so.  
 
The proposed research agenda also recognizes that institutional explanations for the 
development of internal auditing merit consideration along with our Foucauldian explanation 
of internal audit services. The research agenda under Proposition 1 broadly accommodates 
institutional and professionalization issues. Institutional pressure in recent times emphasizes 
the assurance role of internal auditors (Miller and Napier, 1993), and regulators at the societal 
level have moderated the jurisdictional competition between internal and external auditors 
(Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001). Another institutional issue is the restriction of outsourcing 
internal audit work to external auditors after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the resulting 
boundary definition between internal and external auditing (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010). The 
outsourcing of internal auditing as a “non-core” activity has challenged the quest for the 
professionalization of internal auditing because this quest has been premised on internal 
auditors’ ability to provide value-adding services to the firm (Rittenberg and Covaleski, 
2001). The association of internal audit outsourcing to the fall of Arthur Andersen and the 
subsequent mandating of in-house internal audit departments in some stock exchanges with 
associated prohibition of outsourcing to external auditors (Caplan et al., 2007) suggests that 
internal auditing is becoming part of the wider system of societal surveillance. Prior research 
evidence indicates that institutional pressure for more assurance-type activities of internal 
auditors serves only a temporary advantage, while it will undermine the professionalism of 
internal auditors over the long term (Nagy and Cenker, 2007). The recent development trends 
in internal audit practice along the value-adding direction as opposed to maintaining the 
narrower boundaries of assurance (IIA, 2014) illustrate the tension between institutional 
pressure and professionalization.  
 
In conclusion, this study illustrates the potential of the Foucauldian framework to support 
internal audit research from the critical and interpretive perspectives advocated in this paper 
and which are also implicit in the propositions we suggest for further research. This 
framework provides conceptual tools to analyze how internal auditing fits into the spectrum 
of power technologies in a social context of governing organizations. Further research is 
needed to refine the arguments advanced here, and this necessitates noting the Foucauldian 
ontological position, which has methodological implications. That is, research pursuing the 
above propositions—or research more generally concerned with internal auditing deploying 
the Foucauldian framework—will depart from the positivist assumption that research 
phenomena are objective reality existing independent of their contexts. This departure is 
necessary if future research is to address a full range of research questions on internal 
auditing, thereby tackling questions neglected by prior research. In particular, the conceptual 
articulation of internal auditing presented in this paper advances internal auditing research by 
offering a framework that enables us to understand the how of internal auditing. This aspect 
has largely been ignored because of the inconsistency of its intellectual concern with the 






[1] The US-based Global IIA provides professional certification and guidance to its more than 180,000 members worldwide working with 
local institutes in various countries (https://global.theiia.org/Pages/Institutes.aspx). Local institutes tend to have a degree of autonomy in 
their form of organization. For instance, the IIA-UK is organized as the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (http://www.iia.org.uk/), 
whereas local institutes in other countries such as Australia (http://www.iia.org.au/) follow the same form of organization as the Global 
IIA. 
  
[2] The IIA also emphasizes in its position papers that an internal audit should maintain its independent objective assurance role in the 
effective operation of the risk-management system and that this role precludes internal auditors from being involved in decisions such as 
‘[s]etting the risk appetite, [i]mposing risk-management processes, … [t]aking decisions on risk responses, [i]mplementing risk responses 
on management's behalf, [and taking] [a]ccountability for risk management.’ (The Risk and Insurance Management Society and The 
Institute of Internal Auditors 2012; The Institute of Internal Auditors 2004, , p. 2). 
 
[3] Other roles include operational (24%), compliance/regulatory (14%), Sarbanes-Oxley (12%), information technology (10%), risk 
management (7%), business strategy (6%), corporate governance (4%), fraud (4%), and other (10%) (IIA, 2014, p. 7). The survey results of 
the years 2012 and 2013 were also largely consistent with those of 2014. 
 
[4] Yet this “functional” interpretation of governmentality—in any specific setting—is only the systemic appreciation thereof and derived 
from select writings of Foucault (see, in particular, Foucault, 1977). Dean (1999, p. 17) has emphasized that governmentality can be 
fruitfully examined by deploying four lines of inquiry: [i] ontologically, ‘concerned with what we seek to act upon, the governed or ethical 
substance’; [ii] ascetics, ‘concerned with how we govern this substance, the governing or ethical work’; [iii] deontologically, ‘concerned 
with who we are when we govern in such a manner, our mode of subjectification, or the governable or ethical subject’ and [iv] 
teleologically, ‘concerned with why we govern or are governed … that which might be called the telos of government or ethical practices’. 
Our point in this context is not to investigate how these lines of inquiry might (or might not) be pursued in the context of an examination 
of internal auditing. Rather, it is to point out that they can be pursued as an element of governmentality. As such, the functional analysis 
of power is significantly augmented. 
 
 
 
 
